The effectiveness of high microwave power for disrupting drones at different distances and in different weather conditions is evaluated. It goes on to analyse electronic attack using microwave power with high frequency to immediately switch off drones. This article aims to examine the directed energy of HPM (high power microwaves) in using the electromagnetic field strength energy to damage the drone's structure or burn its PCB board electronics. This technology is not very likely to able to knock out a rogue drone and is incapable of stopping programmable drones. The growing number of incidents involving modified drones proves the weakness of existing technology in stopping and neutralising errant drones such as the hand-held gun jammer, trained eagle, R.F. The primary research objective is to reduce the dangers of rogue drones in our lives and the consequences of extremist groups, drug dealers, and organised criminals using them.
This article, through an analysis of ISIS drone propaganda, provides a rare insight into non-state actors' perception of drones and the communicative value of drone images, in addition to suggesting further avenues for the incorporation of political–geographical studies of verticality into the study of political violence and rhetoric. The use of drone imagery, we argue, taps into long-standing visual and discursive strategies which associate vertical hierarchy and flying with mastery and control, allowing ISIS to display attributes of aerial sovereignty. After outlining ISIS' use of drones for combat air support and to film ground (particularly VBIED) attacks, we argue, drawing on political geography, that ISIS employs drones in propaganda to stake and reinforce a claim to sovereign control of territory, performed through the flying of aircraft. While ISIS' use of drone strikes takes place in a tactical rather than strategic setting, its employment of drones to film VBIED attacks allows them to achieve a strategic effect. Analysing the three principal uses of drone imagery by ISIS-images of drone strikes, images of other attacks and observation-we argue that ISIS's use of drones distinguishes itself from other state and non-state uses of drones primarily by its communicative and symbolic value.
This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the Islamic State's use of images taken by drones, drawing on a dataset of ISIS propaganda images from October 2016 to December 2018.
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